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PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 07-2151
____________
IN RE: STANLEY J. CATERBONE,
Stanley J. Caterbone, Appellant
____________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civil No. 06-cv-05012)
District Judge: Honorable Anita B. Brody
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 17, 2011
____________
Before: BARRY, CHAGARES and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: April 4, 2011)
____________
Stanley J. Caterbone, Pro se
Advanced Media Group
1250 Fremont Street
Lancaster, PA 17603
William Kanter, Esq.
Jeffrica J. Lee, Esq.
Appellate Staff, Civil Division, Room 7537
Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20530-0001

Catherine L. Sakach, Esq.
Court Appointed Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the Court
Duane Morris LLP
1940 Route 70 East
Cherry Hill, NJ 08003
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
BARRY, Circuit Judge
This case involves an untimely notice of appeal to the
District Court after the Bankruptcy Court‟s dismissal, for
cause, of a Chapter 11 petition. The question before us is
whether, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2) and the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, an untimely filing such as the
one at issue here deprives subsequent reviewing courts—here,
both the District Court and this Court—of jurisdiction over
the appeal. We conclude that it does. Accordingly, we will
dismiss the instant appeal and remand to the District Court
with instructions to dismiss the appeal to it from the
Bankruptcy Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
I. Background
Appellant Stanley J. Caterbone filed a Chapter 11
bankruptcy petition in May 2005. The United States Trustee
subsequently moved to dismiss the petition for cause, and the
Bankruptcy Court granted the motion on October 3, 2006,
citing various substantive and procedural deficiencies. See 11
U.S.C. § 1112(b).
The order of dismissal was mailed to Caterbone by
first class mail on October 5, 2006. On October 16, he sent a
notice of appeal by first class mail and electronic mail.
However, the notice of appeal was filed with the District
Court on October 19, rendering it untimely because it
occurred outside the ten-day window, then in place, for filing
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a notice of appeal. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a) (2006).1 It
is undisputed that Caterbone did not file a “request to extend
the time for filing a notice of appeal … by written motion …
before the time for filing a notice of appeal ha[d] expired,”
nor did the Bankruptcy Court grant such an extension
following “a motion filed not later than 20 days after the
expiration of the time for filing a notice of appeal … upon a
showing of excusable neglect.” Id. 8002(c)(2).
Despite its untimely filing, Caterbone‟s appeal was
docketed in the District Court on November 14, and the
Trustee did not argue that it was untimely. On March 15,
2007, the Court sua sponte dismissed the appeal, citing
Caterbone‟s failure to comply with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8006,
which requires that a petitioner designate “items to be
included in the record on appeal and a statement of the issues
to be presented.” Caterbone appealed to this Court. Shortly
thereafter, the Trustee moved to dismiss the appeal, citing, for
the first time, Caterbone‟s initial untimely notice of appeal,
and arguing that, as a result of the untimely filing, the District
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Following various intervening events, including the
appointment of amicus curiae, the case is now before us. The
Trustee argues that, consistent with Bowles v. Russell, 551
1

In amending Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a), effective
December 1, 2009, to expand the time for filing a notice of
appeal to fourteen days, the Supreme Court‟s accompanying
Order provided that the amendment “shall govern in all
proceedings in bankruptcy cases thereafter commenced and,
insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings then pending.”
Supreme Court of the United States, Order Amending Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (Mar. 26, 2009). The Trustee
argues that the “just and practicable” rationale is inapplicable
here. Moreover, the Trustee notes that Caterbone‟s notice of
appeal was dated, but not filed, on October 16, and argues,
persuasively in our view, that even if the expanded period
were to apply, the notice of appeal was still untimely because
it was filed the sixteenth day after entry of the Bankruptcy
Court‟s order.
3

U.S. 205 (2007), Section 158(c)(2) established a mandatory,
jurisdictional deadline that statutorily encompasses Rule
8002(a)‟s specified timeline for appealing the judgment of a
bankruptcy court, such that the timeline is not akin to a
freestanding, waivable “claim-processing rule” within the
meaning of Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004). Amicus
argues similarly. Caterbone, on the other hand, elides the
Bowles analysis and argues, inter alia, that his untimely filing
should be addressed, and excused, under the standard of
“excusable neglect” set forth in Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v.
Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380 (1993).
For the reasons explained below, we hold that the
prescribed timeline within which an appeal from a bankruptcy
court must be filed is mandatory and jurisdictional, thus
affirming, in light of Bowles, the rule that we applied in
Shareholders v. Sound Radio, Inc., 109 F.3d 873, 879 (3d
Cir. 1997).
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
Jurisdiction is the threshold issue in this case, and we
must address its relevance both to the decision rendered by
the District Court, and to our review of that decision. Thus,
as an initial matter, we note that we have jurisdiction over the
final decision that the District Court rendered on Caterbone‟s
appeal from the Bankruptcy Court. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1).
Our authority includes reviewing whether the District Court‟s
own exercise of jurisdiction, per § 158(a), was proper. That
is because “subject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a
court‟s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or
waived[, such that courts] … have an independent obligation
to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even
in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y
& H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
Ordinarily, we apply plenary review to final orders of
a district court sitting as an appellate court reviewing the
decision of a bankruptcy court. In re Carnegie Ctr. Assocs.,
129 F.3d 290, 294 (3d Cir. 1997). However, following from
4

our obligation to determine the threshold issue of subject
matter jurisdiction, see Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514, and where,
as here, a party “contest[s] our jurisdiction and that of the
District Court, … [w]e exercise de novo review over [the]
question[] of subject matter jurisdiction.” Great W. Mining &
Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 (3d
Cir. 2010). This is the case even where, again as here, a
district court “exercis[es its] jurisdiction” and dismisses a
cause of action for some other reason. Id. If our independent
review yields the conclusion that the District Court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over an appeal from the
Bankruptcy Court, the appropriate disposition is dismissal of
the appeal. In re Caribbean Tubular Corp., 813 F.2d 533,
535 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that where it is found that a
district court lacked appellate jurisdiction over a bankruptcy
court order, the court of appeals must dismiss the appeal to it,
and remand to the district court with instructions to vacate its
order and to dismiss the appeal from the bankruptcy court).
III. Discussion
An appeal from a decision of a bankruptcy court is
subject to the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2), which
provides that appeals “shall be taken in the same manner as
appeals in civil proceedings generally are taken to the courts
of appeals from the district courts and in the time provided by
Rule 8002 of the Bankruptcy Rules.” When Caterbone filed
his appeal, that rule provided, in relevant part, that “notice of
appeal shall be filed with the clerk within 10 days of the date
of the entry of the judgment, order, or decree appealed from.”
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a) (2006).
Although Kontrick affirmed as “„axiomatic‟” the
proposition that requirements contained in a bankruptcy rule
alone are not jurisdictional (and, hence, are waivable), 540
U.S. at 453 (citation omitted), Section 158 provides the
statutory basis for the courts‟ jurisdiction over bankruptcy
appeals.
See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) & (d) (specifying
circumstances of “district courts[‟] … jurisdiction to hear
appeals” and the “courts of appeals[‟] … jurisdiction”).
Because Section 158 also specifies the time within which an
5

appeal must be taken—i.e., “in the time provided by Rule
8002”—that requirement is jurisdictional.
As Bowles
clarified, both acknowledging and distinguishing Kontrick,
“the taking of an appeal within [a statutorily] prescribed time
is mandatory and jurisdictional.” 551 U.S. at 209 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, “failure
to file [a] notice of appeal in accordance with the statute
therefore deprive[s] … [courts] of jurisdiction[, and bars a
party from] … rely[ing] on forfeiture or waiver to excuse [a]
lack of compliance with the statute‟s time limitations.” Id. at
213 (citation omitted).
Here, even though it is a bankruptcy rule that specifies
the time within which an appeal must be filed, the statutory
incorporation of that rule renders its requirement statutory
and, hence, jurisdictional and non-waivable. As the Supreme
Court recently observed, while “the distinction between
jurisdictional conditions [i.e., à la Bowles] and claimprocessing rules [i.e., à la Kontrick] can be confusing in
practice[,] … Bowles stands for the proposition that context,
including th[e] Court‟s interpretation of similar provisions in
many years past, is relevant to whether a statute ranks a
requirement as jurisdictional.”
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v.
Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1243, 1247-48 (2010).
Beyond the fact that the statutory text of Section
158(c)(2) incorporates a time condition, historical context
also supports our holding. Prior to Kontrick and Bowles, we
regarded Rule 8002(a)‟s time limit for filing a notice of
appeal as jurisdictional. See Shareholders, 109 F.3d at 879;
Whitemere Dev. Corp., Inc. v. Cherry Hill Twp., 786 F.2d
185, 187 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Universal Minerals, Inc., 755
F.2d 309, 311 (3d Cir. 1985). Kontrick—and, later, Eberhart
v. United States, 546 U.S. 12 (2005)—arguably provided the
opportunity to question whether this rule remained correct.
That being said, a careful reading of Kontrick, Bowles, and
Reed Elsevier confirms that the rule we affirmed in
Shareholders, Whitemere, and Universal Minerals remains
the rule today.
In holding that time constraints for objecting to a
6

discharge in bankruptcy are non-jurisdictional “claimprocessing rules,” Kontrick noted that Congress‟s statutory
grant of jurisdiction to the courts to adjudicate discharges in
bankruptcy contains no reference to a time condition. 540
U.S. at 452-53 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), (b)(2)(I), and
(b)(2)(J)).2 To the contrary, in holding that the statutorilyprescribed time provision for filing an appeal in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding is jurisdictional, Bowles expressly
stated: “Today we make clear that the timely filing of a notice
of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” 551
U.S. at 214. Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that Arbaugh
could be read to state that a clear statement rule applies to
Congress‟s identification of a statutory limitation as
jurisdictional, see 546 U.S. at 515-16,3 Reed Elsevier more
recently clarified that, again à la Bowles,
the relevant question … is not … whether [a
particular statutory provision] itself has long
2

Likewise, in Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 16, 21, the Court
concluded that time provisions in the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure were non-jurisdictional, and thus
waivable. In Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515, the Court concluded
that a numerical provision affecting Title VII claims, but
which was separate from Title VII‟s jurisdictional provision,
thereby was not jurisdictional.
3

As the Court stated in Arbaugh:
[W]e think it the sounder course to refrain from
constricting § 1331 or Title VII‟s jurisdictional
provision, and to leave the ball in Congress‟
court. If the Legislature clearly states that a
threshold limitation on a statute‟s scope shall
count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants
will be duly instructed and will not be left to
wrestle with the issue. But when Congress does
not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as
jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction
as nonjurisdictional in character.
546 U.S. at 515-16 (internal citations and reference
omitted).
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been labeled jurisdictional, but whether the type
of limitation that [it] imposes is one that is
properly ranked as jurisdictional absent an
express designation. The statutory limitation in
Bowles was of a type that we had long held did
“speak in jurisdictional terms” even absent a
“jurisdictional” label, and nothing about [that
provision‟s] text or context, or the historical
treatment of that type of limitation, justified a
departure from this view.
130 S. Ct. at 1248.
It is evident, in light of Shareholders, Whitemere, and
Universal Minerals, that we “ha[ve] long held” that Section
158(c)(2)‟s incorporation of the filing timeline specified in
Rule 8002(a) “speak[s] in jurisdictional terms[,] even absent a
jurisdictional label, and [that] nothing about [its] text or
context, or [its] historical treatment … justifie[s] a departure
from this view.” See Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at 1248.
Because it was both prior to and shortly after Reed Elsevier
that we affirmed in non-precedential opinions that the time
requirement for filing a bankruptcy appeal is jurisdictional,
we now take the occasion to so hold in a precedential
opinion.4 Doing so comports with the fact that, unlike the
rules that Eberhart and Kontrick held were non-jurisdictional,
Rule 8002(a)‟s time limit is rooted in a congressionallyenacted statute. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002, advisory
committee note (noting that “th[e] rule is an adaptation of”
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)); see also Bowles, 551 U.S. at 212, 213
(“[A] statute-based filing period for civil cases is
jurisdictional. . . . Because Congress decides whether federal
courts can hear cases at all, it can also determine when, and
under what conditions, federal courts can hear them. Put
another way, the notion of subject-matter jurisdiction
obviously extends to … when Congress prohibits federal
courts from adjudicating an otherwise legitimate class of
4

For purposes of reference only, we note In re Taylor,
343 F. App‟x 753, 755 (3d Cir. 2009), and In re Jacobowitz,
384 F. App‟x 93, 94 (3d Cir. 2010).
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cases after a certain period has elapsed from final judgment.”
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Taking all
of this into consideration, we conclude that the rule we
enunciated in Shareholders remains good law.5
Given the fact that subject matter jurisdiction over
Caterbone‟s appeal to the District Court was, and is,
lacking—and that jurisdictional defect also bars us from
reviewing the merits of his appeal to us—we need not address
the Court‟s dismissal of his appeal for failure to prosecute.
Nor need we address Caterbone‟s argument that his
“excusable neglect” saves his untimely filing, given the clear
text of Rule 8002 and the guidance of Shareholders:
Rule 8002(c) … requires that even in cases of
excusable neglect, the issue must be raised and
the appeal filed within the … window of Rule
8002 (Rule 8002(a)‟s [timeline] for the appeal +
8002(c)‟s [timeline] for the extension). The
rule does not allow a party to claim excusable
neglect after the [time period] ha[s] expired.
109 F.3d at 879 (internal citations omitted). Finally, we
decline to address Caterbone‟s remaining arguments, because
they do not pertain to the threshold issue of jurisdiction.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the instant
appeal and remand to the District Court with instructions to
dismiss Caterbone‟s appeal from the Bankruptcy Court for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

5

Our conclusion is consistent with the holdings of our
sister circuits that have affirmed that the filing timeline for
bankruptcy appeals is jurisdictional. See In re Latture, 605
F.3d 830, 837 (10th Cir. 2010); In re Wiersma, 483 F.3d 933,
938 (9th Cir. 2007); In re B.A.R. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 2010
WL 4595554 (2d Cir. Nov. 15, 2010) (citing In re Siemon,
421 F.3d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 2005)).
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